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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 VIENNA 8634

LIMDIS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: POSSIBLE QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS (FOR USE WITH THE PRESS)

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT REQUEST OF ALLIES US REP CIRCULATED LIST
OF POSSIBLE QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN PRESS CONTACTS
PRIOR TO OPENING OF CONFERENCE AND SOME INFORMAL GUIDELINES
FOR POSSIBLE BACKGROUNDING RESPONSES. ALLIES DISCUSSED PAPER
AND MADE MINOR AMENDMENTS IN AD HOC GROUP MEETING OCTOBER 16
AND 17. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WERE DESIGNED MAINLY TO HELP
ALLIES, BUT THEY MAY ALSO BE OF SOME USE TO WASHINGTON
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS CONCERNED WITH MBFR. TEXT
INCLUDING CHANGES SUGGESTED BY ALLIES FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

I. GENERAL

1. WHAT DO THE ALLIES EXPECT TO ACHIEVE IN MBFR? WHAT
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IS THEIR AIM?

WE SEEK TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF FORCES AND ENHANCE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHILE MAINTAINING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. TO ACHIEVE THIS WILL BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY IN EUROPE AND TO WORLD PEACE.

2. WON'T FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE MAKE AVAILABLE MORE ARMAMENTS TO BE SUPPLIED TO SUCH CONFLICTS AS THE ONE RAGING IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

AN MBFR AGREEMENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS FOR OTHER AREAS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

3. ISN'T IT INCONSISTANT TO NEGOTIATE ON MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHILE THERE IS A WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

4. HOW SOON CAN WE EXPECT AN AGREEMENT?

IT WON'T BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE ANY REALISTIC FORECAST UNTIL WE ARE DEEPTER INTO THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ALLIES WILL MOVE AS FAST AS CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY PERMIT.

5. ARE YOU PESSIMISTIC/OPTIMISTIC?

THESE WILL BE COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUBJECT MATTER IS INHERENTLY COMPLICATED, AND IT TOUCHES UPON VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

WE EXPECT THE EASTERN DELEGATES WILL HAVE PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN AND WILL BARGAIN HARD; AND WE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANYTHING WE ARE GOING TO SIGN.

NEVERTHELESS, THE PREPARATORY TALKS INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES ARE APPROACHING THE SUBJECT SERIOUSLY. HENCE, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE REASONABLE PROSPECTS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME.

6. HOW MUCH MONEY WILL BE SAVED BY MBFR?

IT IS DIFFICULT TO SPECULATE ON THE BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF MBFR AT THIS STAGE. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT COSTS OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT ARE RISING AND CERTAIN FORCE IMPROVEMENTS WILL STILL BE NECESSARY. IN ANY CASE, THE MAIN PURPOSE OF MBFR IS NOT ONE OF SAVING MONEY. THE MAIN PURPOSE IS TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE.

7. ARE THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS WELL PREPARED?

WE THINK SO. BOTH NATIONAL AND NATO STUDIES ON MBFR HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR A PERIOD OF YEARS AND WE HAVE BEEN IN INCREASINGLY INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS IN THE PAST YEAR

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RESULTING IN A COMMON NATO POSITION.

8. HOW ARE THE ALLIES COORDINATING THEIR POSITION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS?

THE ALLIES HAVE DEVELOPED A COMMON POSITION, BOTH IN THE INITIAL TALKS, AND IN THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN BRUSSELS AND VIENNA ARE IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH EACH OTHER.

9. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE NATO ALLIES?

OF COURSE THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT VIEWS AMONG THE TWELVE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SURPRISING IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN ON A SUBJECT RELATED SO DIRECTLY TO THE SECURITY OF ALL. THE MAIN ISSUES WHICH HAVE ARISEN HERETOFORE HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. FUTURE PROBLEMS MAY WELL ARISE IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE BASIS OF PAST EXPERIENCE WITH IT, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIED CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WILL SUCCESSFULLY DEAL WITH THEM.

10. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS CLAIMED THAT MBFR WAS A SOVIET INITIATIVE. WAS IT?

IT IS TRUE THAT THERE WERE SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THE FIFTIES FOR WITHDRAWALS OF FOREIGN FORCES, BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THE USSR EDGED AWAY FROM THE SUBJECT DURING THE 60'S. THE INITIATIVE WHICH LED TO THE PRESENT TALKS WAS TAKEN BY NATO AT THE REYKJAVIK MINISTERIAL MEETING IN JUNE 1968 AND THE WEST HAS BEEN THE CONSISTENT ADVOCATE OF MBFR IN RECENT YEARS. IN THE COURSE OF TIME, THE EAST RESPONDED TO THIS INITIATIVE AND HAS NOW AGREED TO START THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE EAST NOW APPEARS TO BE COMMITTED TO THE TALKS.

11. WHAT POSITION WILL THE SOVIET UNION TAKE?

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC SOVIET POSITIONS AT THIS TIME, AND IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO SPECULATE ABOUT THEM.

MORE GENERALLY, WE HAVE GOTTEN THE USSR TO COME TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AT THE PRELIMINARY TALKS AND IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS EXPECT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE SUBJECT.

12. ARE THE RUSSIANS SERIOUS ABOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS? WHAT ARE THEIR MOTIVES?

THEY APPEAR SERIOUS. THEY ARE HERE IN VIENNA TO
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NEGOTIATE. SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS INDICATE A POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, THEY INDICATE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE, IN WHICH THE USSR HAS WEIGHTY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT STAKE, AS WELL AS MILITARY ONES. MBFR IS INDEED ONE PART OF THE TOTALITY OF CONCERNS AFFECTED BY THE MOVE TOWARD AN EAST-WEST DETENTE.

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LIMDIS

13. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP TO SALT?

THERE IS NO DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN MBFR AND SALT. SALT, AS YOU KNOW, IS A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION CONCERNED WITH AMERICAN AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES. MBFR IS A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION FOCUSED ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

14. WHAT IS THE RELATION TO CSCE?

THERE IS NO DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN MBFR AND CSCE. CSCE IS A BROADER FORUM WHICH DEALS WITH A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL DEAL WITH MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITH THE AIM OF REACHING BINDING AGREEMENTS.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

1. WHY DOES THE WEST REJECT THE IDEA OF ALL-EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION?

WE ARE CONCENTRATING ON THE AREA -- CENTRAL EUROPE -- WHERE CONFRONTATION IS MOST EVIDENT. WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO GET CONCRETE RESULTS IF PARTICIPATION IS LIMITED TO COUNTRIES WITH A CLEARLY DEFINED MILITARY INTEREST IN
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THAT AREA.

IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, MBFR WILL DIRECTLY AFFECT THE VITAL SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE COUNTRIES WHOSE FORCES AND TERRITORIES ARE IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

SECOND, OTHER ALLIES -- THE FLANK STATES -- WILL ALSO HAVE IMPORTANT SECURITY CONCERNS INVOLVED IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR THAT REASON ARE REPRESENTED HERE AT THE CONFERENCE.

WE ACCEPT THAT YET OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE AN INTEREST IN OUR WORK -- ALBEIT A LESS DIRECT INTEREST. THESE COUNTRIES HAVE DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH THE PARTICIPANTS AND CAN, AND FROM TIME TO TIME DO, MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN. WE BELIEVE THAT NON-PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WILL HAVE AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE VIEWS KNOWN TO THE PARTICIPANTS AND WE ARE READY AND WILLING TO KEEP THEM INFORMED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THESE COUNTRIES WOULD AGREE THAT ENLARGEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE WOULD MAKE IT A LESS EFFICIENT FORUM AND COULD DETRACT FROM THE CHANCES FOR AGREEMENT.

2. DO YOU EXPECT TO NEGOTIATE A FORMAL AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE?

WE MIGHT, BUT IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE NECESSARY.

WE ACHIEVED AGREEMENT AT THE INITIAL TALKS THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO INTRODUCE TOPICS FOR NEGOTIATION, AND WE ARE THUS ASSURED THAT THE SUBJECTS THE WEST WANTS ADDRESSED WILL BE FACT BE TAKEN UP.

3. DIDN'T WE TALK TO THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES FOR A LONG TIME IN VIENNA EARLIER THIS YEAR?

WE DID, BUT THESE TALKS COVERED PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS WHICH HAD TO BE IRONED OUT FIRST. THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES COME NOW.

III. NATO REDUCION OBJECTIVES

1. HOW LARGE WILL THE REDUCTION BE?

IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO TRY TO STATE WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATION WILL BE BEFORE IT HAS BEGUN.

2. WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM LIMIT THAT NATO COULD AFFORD?

NO MAGIC FORMULA CAN DERIVE AN ABSTRACT FIGURE, BUT ANY PROPOSAL WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRESERVING THE ALLIES' SECURITY UNDIMINISHED.

3. DOES NATO HAVE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL? WHEN WILL IT BE CONFIDENTIAL

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ADVANCED?

THE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE CARRIED OUT CAREFUL PREPARATIONS FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS AND WE DO HAVE IN MIND SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO MBFR ISSUES WHICH WE WILL BE ADVANCING TO THE EAST IN DUE COURSE.

4. IS NATO'S OBJECTIVE A COMMON CEILING?

IT WOULD BE PREMATURE BEFORE THE CONFERENCE BEGINS

FOR ME TO ATTEMPT TO DISCUSS NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS OR
REDUCTION OPTIONS.

5. ARE THE STORES WE HAVE SEEN IN THE PRESS ABOUT THE
ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR TRUE?
ONE EXPECTS IN A COMPLEX NEGOTIATING SITUATION LIKE
THIS THAT THERE WILL BE MUCH PRESS SPECULATION, SOME
MORE ACCURATE AND SOME LESS SO. OUR POLICY IS NOT TO
COMMENT ON SUCH SPECULATIONS, FOR THAT WOULD IMMEDIATELY
LEAD TO FULL PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF DETAILS OF CONFIDENTIAL
NEGOTIATIONS.

6. WOULD THE RUSSIANS REALLY ACCEPT A 10 PERCENT NATO CUT AS
AGAINST A 20 PERCENT CUT ON THEIR SIDE?
IT IS NOT HELPFUL TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE CONTENT OF
PROPOSALS WHICH ARE STILL TO BE ADVANCED. AS TO THE
ACCEPTABILITY TO THE EAST OF ONE OR ANOTHER FORMULA,
THAT TOO REMAINS TO BE SEEN IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
THE PROPOSALS WE WILL MAKE TO THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE
FAIR. OUR PROPOSALS NATURALLY WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF DIS-
PARITIES IN THE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES AS WE SEE THEM.
THE OTHER SIDE IS FREE TO ACCEPT A WESTERN PROPOSAL OR
MAKE COUNTER PROPOSALS.

7. HOW WOULD ONE ARRIVE AT A SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR A REDUC-
TION PROPOSAL?
THE PROPOSALS THE ALLIES WILL MAKE ARE BASED ON THEIR
UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES ARE DIFFERENT
IN SIZE, STRUCTURE, POSTURE AND REINFORCEMENT POTENTIAL,
AND THAT ANY REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH IV. 1.)

8. WILL US AND SOVIET FORCES BE THE FIRST TO BE REDUCED?
THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH WILL BE ANSWERED ONLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. WILL THE OTHER NATO FORCES BE INCLUDE IN MBFR AND AT WHAT STAGE?
THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH WILL BE ANSERED ONLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

10. HOW MANY AMERICANS MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS?
I THINK IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TRY TO ANSWERE THAT QUESTION NOW.

11. WILL REDUCTION BE MADE ONLY IN MANPOWER? IN EQUIPMENT?
IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE SPECIFIC REDUCTION PROPOSALS. I CAN, HOWEVER, SAY THAT THE WEST HAS STUDIED CAREFULLY A VARIETY OF APPROACHES.

12. WILL WITHDRAWN US AND SOVIET TROOPS BE DISBANDED? WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO EUROPEAN FORCES?
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THIS IS A SUBJECT WHICH IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DISCUSS UNTIL THE TIME THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. ARE AIRCRAFT/NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE REDUCED?
THIS IS A SUBJECT WHICH IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DISCUSS.

14. WHAT WILL BE THE INITIAL REACTION IF THE SOVIET DEMAND REDUCTIONS OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MBFR CONTEXT?
IT WOULD BE POINTLESS TO SPECULATE ON POSSIBLE SOVIET PROPOSALS. WE INTEND TO FOCUS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

15. DOES NOT LOWERING FORCE LEVELS MEAN LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD?
NO CHANGE IN THE AGREED NATO STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS FORESEN AS A RESULT OF MBFR.

16. HOW MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES THE US HAVE IN CENTRAL EUROPE?
THE US MAINTAINS A LARGE AND VARIED STOCKPILE. WE CANNOT GIVE DETAILS.

17. WHAT ARE THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR? WOULD WE EXPECT TO USE THEM, AND HOW?
THEY ARE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE, AND WOULD BE USED ONLY IF NECESSARY IN THE EVENT THAT A NATO COUNTRY WAS ATTACKED. AGREED NATO STRATEGY CALLS FOR FORWARD DEFENSE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

18. ARE HUNGARIAN FORCES OR SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY TO BE REDUCED? IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO TRY TO SPELL OUT WHAT THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT MIGHT LOOK LIKE. I CAN, HOWEVER, RECALL THAT AMBASSADOR QUARLES MADE CLEAR IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS RESERVE THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE SUBJECT OF INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN REDUCTIONS OR OTHER MEASURES.

19. IS IT TRUE THAT HUNGARY HAS BEEN EXCLUDED FROM MBFR? I MEAN DESPITE WHATEVER HAPPENS FURTHER NORTH THROUGH MBFR, COULD THE RUSSIANS STAY IN HUNGARY IN THEIR PRESENT NUMBERS OR EVEN INCREASE?
THE MULTILATERAL INITIAL TALKS IN VIENNA LAST SPRING WERE CONFIDENTIAL

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ESSENTIALLY PROCEDURAL, ALTHOUGH PROCEDURE DOES HAVE SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. WHAT WAS HAMMERED OUT WAS AN AGREEMENT WHICH GAVE THE SOVIETS NO PROCEDURAL GROUNDS TO RESIST THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE ARISING AGAIN. THE QUESTION OF WHAT SORT OF LIMITATIONS MIGHT APPLY TO HUNGARY REMAINS TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

20. WHAT ABOUT FRENCH FORCES?
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE ITS VIEWS ON MBFR KNOWN, AND ANY COMMENT ON FRENCH FORCES OR THE POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION SHOULD LOGICALLY COME FROM FRANCE.

21. WON'T AN MBFR AGREEMENT GIVE THE RUSSIANS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN NATO AND WEST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS?
AN MBFR AGREEMENT WOULD, OF COURSE, IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES. I AM SURE THE WEST WILL HONOR ANY COMMITMENTS IT MAY UNDERTAKE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY AGREEMENT WHICH GIVES THE RUSSIANS ANY RIGHTS TO INTERFERE WITH NATO OR MEDDLE IN WEST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

IV. THE MILITARY SITUATION

1. ARE WARSAW PACT FORCES EQUAL TO/SUPERIOR TO NATO'S
THIS IS A MATTER OF JUDGEMENT. BUT IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA, WITH WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCERNED, THERE ARE IMPORTANT DISPARITIES IN THE SITUATION OF THE TWO SIDES, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THESE DISPARITIES WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR: SPECIFIC EXAMPLES INCLUDE DIFFERENCES IN GROUND MAN-

POWER, THE LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS IN PACT FORCES AND THE
DISPARITY OF GEOGRAPHY WHICH FOR EXAMPLE FACILITATES SOVIET AS
COMPARED WITH AMERICAN REINFORCEMENT. WE WILL BE IN A POSITION
TO GIVE MORE DETAILS AFTER THE TALKS HAVE STARTED.
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2. ARE IISS FIGURES ACCURATE?

THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE USED THE BEST FIGURES AVAILABLE
TO THEM IN THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR MBFR, AND WILL USE OFFICIAL
ALLIED DATA AS NECESSARY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST.

A VARIETY OF PUBLICATIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE USED
DIFFERENT FIGURES, AND, GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF EASTERN
SOCIETIES, THESE HAVE DIFFERED FROM TIME TO TIME. I WILL NOT
ATTEMPT NOW TO COMMENT ON ANY PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED FIGURES.

3. HOW ARE ASYMMETRIES TO BE DEALT WITH?

ONE OBVIOUS WAY IN FOR THE WARSAW PACT FORCES TO BE REDUCED
MORE THAN NATO FORCES. IN ADDITION, OTHER PROVISIONS OF AN
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCES.

4. THE EAST HAS REJECTED THE IDEA OF "BALANCED". DOES NOT THIS
RULE OUT ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS?
WHILE THE EAST HAS NOT AGREED TO USE THE WORD, WE DID AT THE
PREPARATORY TALKS ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNDERLYING
CONCEPT. THIS UNDERSTANDING WAS REFLECTED IN COMMUNIQUE
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LANGUAGE REFERRING TO MEASURES "CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE
AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT
EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY
FOR EACH PARTY." THE NATO ALLIES INTEND TO PURSUE THE CONCEPT
OF BALANCE.

5. ARE THE SOVIETS INCREASING OR IMPROVING THEIR FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE?

YES TO BOTH. THERE HAVE BEEN INCREASE IN SOVIET GROUND FORCES
IN RECENT YEARS, AND THERE HAVE BEEN BOTH AUGMENTATIONS AND IMPROVE-
MENTS IN SOVIET TANKS AND OTHER ARMAMENTS.

6. ARE THE ALLIES INCREASING OR IMPROVING THEIR FORCES IN CENTRAL
EUROPE?

THE OVER-ALL LEVEL OF ALLIED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS
NOT INCREASING, BUT FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ARE UNDER WAY.

7. IS THERE IN FACT A SOVIET THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE? ISN'T
ANOTHER EUROPEAN WAR TERRIBLY UNLIKELY?

WHATEVER THE SOVIET INTENTIONS MAY BE, IT IS A FACT THAT
SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITIES
FOR RAPID OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. IF WAR IS UNLIKELY IN EUROPE,
IT IS DUE TO SUSTAINED WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS OVER THE YEARS.

8. IF A SOVIET "THREAT" EXISTS, HOW IS IT THAT WE ARE DOING
BUSINESS WITH THE RUSSIANS IN DIFFERENT FIELDS ON AN INCREASING
SCALE?

THERE IS NOT INCONSISTENCY HERE. IT IS THE ESSENCE OF WESTERN
POLICY TO SEEK TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS; WHILE STILL
MAINTAINING WESTERN DEFENSES. INDEED, MBFR IS THE FIRST
ATTEMPT IN A MULTILATERAL FRAME WORK TO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS
ARMED FORCES ON BOTH SIDES AND THUS TO PROVIDE A MORE CONCRETE
BASIS FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN POLITICAL RELATIONS.

V. NON-REDUCTION MEASURES

1. WHAT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS ARE ENVISAGED?
THE ALLIED STUDIES HAVE CANVASSED A VARIETY OF POSSIBILITIES,
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AND WE EXPECT TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO THE EAST IN DUE COURSE. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR US TO TRY TO GO INTO DETAILS ABOUT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS.

2. HOW WILL YOU VERIFY REDUCTION? IN ON-SITE INSPECTION PART OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL?

PRECISE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WOULD DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON WHAT KIND OF REDUCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY AGREED. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE ON THIS POINT.

3. WHAT ARE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS/STABILIZING MEASURES?

IN ORDER FOR FORCE REDUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVE THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN A CONTEXT OF OTHER MEASURES TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION, ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, PROVIDE BETTER WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A BUILDUP AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY.

4. WHAT ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MBFR OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA?

IN BROAD POLITICAL TERMS WE BELIEVE THAT SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATIONS OF BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY. IT WILL BE A MAJOR YARDSTICK BY WHICH EASTERN SERIOUSNESS IN DETENTE WILL BE MEASURED BY PUBLIC AND POLITICAL OPINION IN MANY COUNTRIES. IN MORE SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL TERMS, WE HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF REDISPOSITION OF REDUCED FORCES. THE ALLIES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT MBFR MUST NOT PRODUCE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS FOR OTHER AREAS IN EUROPE.
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